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But Phrastor recovered and married a citizen woman, demonstrating (according to Apollodoros) that he had only acknowledged the boy because he thought he was about to die. When Phrastor tried to introduce the boy into his phratry and genos, the boy was rejected as illegitimate, and Phrastor was unable to swear that the boy’s mother was a citizen.

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ὡς γὰρ ἀνέστη τάχιστα: “as soon as possible when he recovered,” “the minute he recovered” (G. 633.f). ἀνέστη < ἀνα-ἵστημι. 

ἀνέλαβεν αὑτόν “regained his strength” (LSJ ἀναλαμβάνω II.3).

ἐπιεικῶς: adverbial form of ἐπιεικής; ἔχω + ἐπιεικῶς: “to be capable,” i.e., “to be well.”

ὥστε: introducing an independent sentence, ὥστε has the force of οὖν (G. 639, S. 2274a).

τἀκόλουθ’ = τὰ ἀκόλουθα, “the sequel,” “what followed.”

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Βρυτίδας: Phrastor’s γένος, the Brytidai. 

ἥτις < ὅστις here, the indirect interrogative pronoun. 

ἀποψηφίζονται “voted against,” “rejected” (+ gen.).

ἐνέγραφον: i.e., inscribe him on the register of the members of the γένος. 

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λαχόντος . . . δίκην: Carey thinks this is a δίκη βλάβης (suit for damages) for not admitting the boy (Carey 1992: 117); Kapparis thinks it is a δίκη similar to suits appealing rejection from demes (1999: 288–89)

προκαλοῦνται “Ostensibly the purpose of the challenge is to avoid litigation or to obtain fresh evidence. In reality challenges are usually issued in the confident expectation that the opponent will decline; since challenges can be introduced as evidence at the trial, the effect is to give the challenger a moral advantage in court” (Carey 1992: 117).

διαιτητῇ: a public arbitrator. 

ὀμόσαι: see §3.

καθ’ ἱερῶν τελείων: i.e., to swear by sacrifices of perfect (unblemished) animals. 

ἦ μήν “surely, absolutely”; introduces indirect statement after a verb of swearing.

ἐγγυητῆς < ἐγγυητός. 

οὐκ ὤμοσεν: Patteson suggests that maybe Phrastor refused to swear because he was thinking ahead to possible remarriage (and therefore didn’t mind giving up his claim that the boy was legitimate); she also argues that, since Phrastor didn’t swear, the arbitrator must have ruled (almost by default) in the favor of the γένος (1978: 95–96). Kapparis, by contrast, argues that Phrastor refused to swear because “the oath would surely be phrased in a manner which served the purposes of the challenger”: for example, Phrastor might have been challenged to swear that the child was born to a citizen woman who was not Phano. However, because the γεννηταί would have been unable to prove that the boy was not legitimate without either solid evidence or the acceptance of a challenge, Kapparis thinks that the γένος lost the arbitration (1999: 290–91). Kapparis’ theory is possible, but we are given no indication in the text that the substance of the challenge is not precisely what Apollodoros gives us in this paragraph (namely that the child was Phrastor’s son from a citizen woman legally married to him).

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Κεφαλῆθεν: of the deme Kephale.

κωλύειν εἰσάγειν: Kapparis 1999: 293 finds this ambiguous, saying that it means only “to produce obstacles to the introduction,” without stating whether the introduction succeeded in the end.